By Charles F. Brower
This ebook argues that American strategists within the Joint Chiefs of employees have been keenly conscious of the inseparability of political and armed forces points of technique within the struggle opposed to Japan in international struggle II. They understood that conflict not just has political assets, it additionally has political reasons that determine the war's goals and aid to outline the character of the peace to persist with. They understood that coverage was once the 'guiding intelligence' for battle, in Clausewitzian phrases, and that to try to strategy strategic difficulties used to be nonsensical.
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Additional resources for Defeating Japan: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Strategy in the Pacific War, 1943–1945
Not only would the operation provide an important boost to Chinese morale; it also would provide the materiel to develop a larger force capable of fighting the Japanese. ”62 Unsupported by the JCS, Stilwell’s arguments fell harmlessly before the president and the British. Missing Stilwell’s point that only the land route could provide decisive support, FDR suggested the solution to the supply problem was to establish an air tonnage objective by summer sufficient to support both Stilwell and Chennault.
In his view, two objectives faced the Allies in China-Burma: “First, to get 7000 tons a month into China by July; and secondly, to open land communications with China. ”63 No one was satisfied with the outcome of these discussions on Burma strategy. Stilwell complained that FDR had been “hypnotized” by the British into “looking for an easy way” to untangle the China-Burma-India knot. Diverting scarce resources to the air offensive was shortsighted and risked the entire effort in China. “Air coverage over nothing is .
Diverting scarce resources to the air offensive was shortsighted and risked the entire effort in China. “Air coverage over nothing is . . 64 If Stilwell had been ineffective in presenting his case and the JCS were committed to that same strategic vision, why did not the JCS provide their theater commander with more support? Indeed, during the entire twohour session no member of the JCS made a substantive statement in support of ANAKIM. The evidence is only suggestive on this point. ” Since Marshall believed FDR supported a modified ANAKIM, “that is, in the north but not in the south, at Rangoon,” the JCS probably concluded that by muting their arguments for an all-out ANAKIM they presented a more unified American position around a modified ANAKIM compromise, decreasing the likelihood of British inaction in the theater.
Defeating Japan: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Strategy in the Pacific War, 1943–1945 by Charles F. Brower